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A personal experiment · alpha · code not public yet · no offer, no support Project status →

Limitations

As of 7 November 2026. The user manual keeps the full list (docs/handbuch.md, chapter 12).

  • Alpha. Formats, interfaces and the catalog can change without notice.
  • No independent security audit. There were internal and automated reviews (threat model).
  • Not released. The code is not public; no packages in repositories, no apps in the stores, no release tag.
  • No release key yet. Release builds pin Vaicoa’s release key ids; the key does not exist yet. Lab builds use keys generated at run time and say so (the apps show an orange or red band).
  • No 24-hour soak test of memory and stability yet.
  • Phones: App Attest on an iPhone, StrongBox and Google’s attestation chain on Android, class-3 biometrics, push delivery over APNs, FCM and UnifiedPush, widgets and watches have run in simulators, emulators and against fake cores, not on real devices.
  • YubiKey over PIV is untested on a real key. Under strict, YubiKeys can count only through FIDO2, and FIDO2 devices cannot sign a suspension yet.
  • The Mac’s Secure Enclave dialog and the menu bar app’s signed build, App Attest and notarisation are unchecked.
  • Android Protected Confirmation is shown, not used.
  • Agent approvals cannot be verified by a node, only human approvals. Risky actions therefore always need a human.
  • Actions against third-party APIs (Hetzner Cloud, Forgejo, Alertmanager, observability, MCP servers) run in a driver at the core; for them the core is the checkpoint, not a node.
  • Nodes do not check the display template’s digest against their pinned templates (closed for release builds by the pinned release key ids).
  • No TPM and no hardware attestation of nodes; under strict, production needs the provider level, today Hetzner Cloud.
  • The core’s IKE key is a file (strongSwan on Ubuntu has no PKCS#11 plugin).
  • No web app, no passkeys, no sessions over OIDC. An identity provider only maps tokens to roster users, at most at level device.
  • Forgejo Actions jobs: the driver cannot restrict a runner’s egress; an LLM gateway is missing.
  • No second signature on the release key, no TUF. Your own actions come as an internal catalog layer, read at start.
  • A refused roster is not in the audit; the refusal reaches only the person who pushed it.
  • Canary releases split by replicas, not by traffic weights (no Gateway API or service mesh support).
  • The signed audit head is evidence, not protection: whoever holds the core’s audit key can sign a shortened head, and a core can refuse to sign. Write the head down somewhere else regularly.
  • k3s and Cluster API: everything with dedicated servers and the UKI path is unproven.
  • Twins with seed data (a copy of an environment for agents to try changes on): an idea, not built in Vaicoa Core.
  • A compliance mapping to standards (ISO 27001, NIS2 and others): not part of Vaicoa Core.
  • The usage report receiver: vaicoa-core usage report --send fails until it is in operation (feedback).
Works in labsNot supported
Ubuntu 24.04 and Debian for core and nodes; arm64 and amd64 packagesWindows hosts, macOS as a node
A single server with Podman; k3s; Cluster API with k3s; Hetzner Cloudother clouds’ APIs (no drivers)
Forgejo for git.change and git.tag, Flux for deploysGitHub, GitLab (no drivers)
Prometheus or VictoriaMetrics, Loki, Tempo, Alertmanager for reads and silencesother observability back ends