A personal experiment · alpha · code not public yet · no offer, no support Project status →
Limitations
As of 7 November 2026. The user manual keeps the full list (docs/handbuch.md, chapter 12).
Not for production
Section titled “Not for production”- Alpha. Formats, interfaces and the catalog can change without notice.
- No independent security audit. There were internal and automated reviews (threat model).
- Not released. The code is not public; no packages in repositories, no apps in the stores, no release tag.
- No release key yet. Release builds pin Vaicoa’s release key ids; the key does not exist yet. Lab builds use keys generated at run time and say so (the apps show an orange or red band).
- No 24-hour soak test of memory and stability yet.
Unproven on real hardware
Section titled “Unproven on real hardware”- Phones: App Attest on an iPhone, StrongBox and Google’s attestation chain on Android, class-3 biometrics, push delivery over APNs, FCM and UnifiedPush, widgets and watches have run in simulators, emulators and against fake cores, not on real devices.
- YubiKey over PIV is untested on a real key. Under
strict, YubiKeys can count only through FIDO2, and FIDO2 devices cannot sign a suspension yet. - The Mac’s Secure Enclave dialog and the menu bar app’s signed build, App Attest and notarisation are unchecked.
- Android Protected Confirmation is shown, not used.
Known gaps
Section titled “Known gaps”- Agent approvals cannot be verified by a node, only human approvals. Risky actions therefore always need a human.
- Actions against third-party APIs (Hetzner Cloud, Forgejo, Alertmanager, observability, MCP servers) run in a driver at the core; for them the core is the checkpoint, not a node.
- Nodes do not check the display template’s digest against their pinned templates (closed for release builds by the pinned release key ids).
- No TPM and no hardware attestation of nodes; under
strict, production needs theproviderlevel, today Hetzner Cloud. - The core’s IKE key is a file (strongSwan on Ubuntu has no PKCS#11 plugin).
- No web app, no passkeys, no sessions over OIDC. An identity provider only maps tokens to roster users, at most
at level
device. - Forgejo Actions jobs: the driver cannot restrict a runner’s egress; an LLM gateway is missing.
- No second signature on the release key, no TUF. Your own actions come as an internal catalog layer, read at start.
- A refused roster is not in the audit; the refusal reaches only the person who pushed it.
- Canary releases split by replicas, not by traffic weights (no Gateway API or service mesh support).
- The signed audit head is evidence, not protection: whoever holds the core’s audit key can sign a shortened head, and a core can refuse to sign. Write the head down somewhere else regularly.
- k3s and Cluster API: everything with dedicated servers and the UKI path is unproven.
Not built
Section titled “Not built”- Twins with seed data (a copy of an environment for agents to try changes on): an idea, not built in Vaicoa Core.
- A compliance mapping to standards (ISO 27001, NIS2 and others): not part of Vaicoa Core.
- The usage report receiver:
vaicoa-core usage report --sendfails until it is in operation (feedback).
Supported setups
Section titled “Supported setups”| Works in labs | Not supported |
|---|---|
| Ubuntu 24.04 and Debian for core and nodes; arm64 and amd64 packages | Windows hosts, macOS as a node |
| A single server with Podman; k3s; Cluster API with k3s; Hetzner Cloud | other clouds’ APIs (no drivers) |
Forgejo for git.change and git.tag, Flux for deploys | GitHub, GitLab (no drivers) |
| Prometheus or VictoriaMetrics, Loki, Tempo, Alertmanager for reads and silences | other observability back ends |